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abstRaCt
Scientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful theory ever 
made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most controversial theory. Its basic 
principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about reality, which are reflected 
in the metaphysical commitments of classical mechanics (CM). The aim of this paper 
is twofold. First, I argue that QM implies an ontological challenge, and not merely an 
“ontic” one, as it has been traditionally interpreted in the analytic tradition. Second, I 
suggest that positions known as “ontological pluralism” exhibit an internal weakness due 
to its unwarranted compromise to a representational view of scientific theories.
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Resumen
La mecánica cuántica (MC) es, desde una perspectiva científica, la teoría más exitosa 
jamás formulada. Desde una perspectiva filosófica, es la teoría científica más polémica. Su 
formalismo desafía principios profundamente arraigados, que consideramos esenciales al 
pensamiento racional. Mi trabajo tiene dos objetivos. El primero es argumentar que MC 
implica un desafío ontológico y no óntico, como ha sido interpretado tradicionalmente en 
la filosofía analítica. El segundo es sugerir que la posición filosófica denominada “plura-
lismo ontológico” sufre de una debilidad interna debido a sus compromisos filosóficos 
con una concepción representacional de las teorías científicas.
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1. intRoduCtion
Scientifically speaking, quantum mechanics (QM) is the most successful 
theory ever made. Philosophically speaking, however, it is the most contro-
versial. Its basic principles seem to contravene our deepest intuitions about 
reality, which are most patently exhibited in the metaphysical commitments 
of classical mechanics (CM).
In the last century many attempts to rejoin CM and QM have taken place, 
like Bohr’s Kantian defense of the priority of classical concepts (1937) or 
Bohm’s search for a classical limit trough the quantum potential ‘R’ (Bohm 
1952). However, most interpretations suffer from one of two main serious 
difficulties: either they are thought to be too restrictive and incapable of 
appreciating the revolutionary features of QM, or else they are thought to be 
too implausible given the strange ontological commitments required by the 
interpretation. Ontological pluralism (OP) has become an attractive middle 
ground between these two poles. A pluralist stance respects the idiosyncratic 
features of each theory, while at the same time restricts their ontology to what 
is required by the mathematical formalism.
An important historical example of OP in quantum physics can be found in 
Werner Heisenberg’s book Physics and Philosophy (1958). According to Heisen-
berg, the history of physics is a succession of theories, were each theory is a 
closed system [abgeschlossene System]. It is “a system of axioms and definitions 
which can be expressed consistently by a mathematical scheme” (Heisenberg 
1958 92). In each system, the concepts are represented by symbols which in 
turn are related by a set of equations, and the resulting “theory” is thought to 
be “an eternal structure of nature, depending neither on a particular space nor 
on particular time” (93). Given this systemic closure, each theory generates 
its own concept of “reality”, whose validity is not restricted by other theories.
After Heisenberg, many sophisticated versions of OP have been proposed 
(Krause 2000; Longino 2002). Most of these approaches disregard Heisenberg’s 
notion of “closed system”. However, they all share a common assumption 
which stems directly from Heisenberg’s treatment of physical theories, and has 
been barely discussed. I will call this assumption the “Comprehension Thesis” 
(CT). According to the CT, to “understand” or “comprehend” something is 
to relate a multiplicity of elements trough a finite number of non-arbitrary 
relations. The local version of this thesis is that each theory must be internally 
comprehended. This is typically achieved through the fixation of the referents 
of some of the theory’s symbols. The symbols are then related to non-symbolic 
items trough what I call “principle of referential persistence” (PRP). A symbol 
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Ψ persistently refers to an item of the world E iff Ψ refers to E in every 
occurrence of Ψ. When each symbol becomes “attached” to its referent, the 
resulting articulation constitutes the ontology of each theory.
Although defenders of OP typically ascribe to CT and PRP, the pluralist 
denies any global application of CT, since this would imply an inter-theoretical 
reduction of the many languages, methods and metaphysical commitments 
into one total theory (or ToE), and the rejection of such a theory is precisely 
the starting point of any ontological pluralism.
The aim of this paper is to show how this restricted use of CT is unwarranted. 
Since OP lacks any alternative conception of “comprehension” for global 
cases, any restriction of CT to the local case shows itself to be arbitrary. As the 
argument develops, it will be suggested that the main reason for this internal 
weakness is that OP upholds, along with scientific realism, a representational 
conception of scientific theories according to which a theory is a description of 
physical reality. This commitment is obviously manifested through the main-
tenance of PRP. It will be argued that the central problem with ontological 
pluralism is that this restriction of CT is incompatible with its own represen-
tational conception of scientific theories.
So the pluralist must choose: either she abandons CT altogether or she fully 
applies it. If she chooses the former option, it is impossible to distinguish onto-
logical pluralism from an instrumentalist account of scientific theories, since 
the problem of comprehending those theories as being about something would 
be completely obliterated. If, on the other hand, she chooses the latter alterna-
tive, then she is confronted with a reductive account of physical theories, since 
her holding of PRP makes it impossible to avoid a Theory of Everything. As 
a conclusion, I suggest that the only viable way to preserve scientific realism 
and avoid a reductive account of global comprehension is to abandon PRP in 
favor of a more dynamic account of the way in which scientific theories relate 
to the physical world.
2. quantum meChaniCs and “the ontologiCal question”
It is commonly held that quantum mechanics (QM) constitutes a philo-
sophical challenge due to the fact that its formalism entails the strangest 
ontological commitments. We speak of “superposition states”, “indistinguis-
hable individuals” or “probability waves” as sorts of entities which we don’t 
fully comprehend, although being thoroughly “described” by the mathema-
tical structure of the theory.
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But how are we to understand the word “ontological” here? For those working 
within the lines of analytic philosophy, a good choice would be to defend a 
Quinean understanding of the problem, famously summed up in the simple 
interrogative: “What is there?” (Quine 1948). Since Quine’s famous formu-
lation, virtually every philosopher in the analytical tradition has though 
the ontological question in exclusively extensional terms, i.e., as a problem 
concerning the extension of some domain, namely, the set of existing things in 
the Universe. If this is so, then the ontological challenge represented by QM 
would be the challenge of understanding how can there be such things as 
“superposition states”, “indistinguishable individuals” or “probability waves” 
in the Universe. But as Taylor has already observed, this formulation of the 
ontological question is “notoriously misleading”, since “it suggests that we are 
already quite clear as to what "Being" is, i.e. as to what we mean when we say 
of something, that it exists” (125).
Let me clarify this point. Each scientific discipline involves the definition and 
delimitation of its own object of inquiry (physical bodies, organisms, societies, 
etc.). In the course of their development, most of these disciplines have changed, 
producing shifts not only in the technical and methodological principles governing 
them, but also (and especially) in the domain of entities accepted by the current 
scientific community. This may happen through the introduction of new entities 
(like the gene in Mendelian genetics) or through their elimination (like phlogiston 
in Lavoisier’s theory or Aether in Einstein’s special relativity). However, the shift 
required by QM is strikingly different, since its postulates seem to defy the most 
basic principles concerning our understanding of Nature. This was what Heelan 
(1975) meant when he wrote that “such changes as quantum mechanics proposed 
affected not merely the content of physics but the very notion of science itself” 
(125). In other words, QM does not only require an extensional shift of the 
domain of physical entities, but also requires an ontological shift concerning our 
very notion of “entity”. If we ignore this radical dimension, we will fall short 
of comprehending what I have called “the ontological question”. This question 
should not be formulated as one about the existence of some sort of entity in 
Nature, but rather as the possibility of having in view another notion of “entity”. 
So one could speak of this “ontological shift” as one that involves the consideration 
of two distinct “ontologies” (in this more profound sense of the term): on the one 
hand, a “classical ontology” or “OC”; on the other hand, a quantum ontology or 
“OQ”. Paraphrasing Kuhn, one could assert that the classical physicist and the 
quantum physicist “live” in two different Natures.
This being said, the “ontological question” should be understood as a ques-
tion about the relation between OC and OQ. As we will see later, different 
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answers to these questions will imply different philosophical attitudes towards 
quantum physics. In particular, “pluralism” should be understood as the 
thesis that both OC and OQ can stand each one in their respective domains. 
In order to stress the fact that this is a metaphysical thesis, we ought to use 
the expression “ontological pluralism” (OP) instead of more frequently used 
labels as “scientific pluralism” or “theoretical pluralism” (cf. Bokulich 2004). 
But before focusing on OP we must first discuss the different features of both 
OC and OQ in more detail.
3. thRee PRinCiPles oF ClassiCal ontology
It would be difficult to argue for a single “classical ontology” in the history 
of Western thought. However, once we make the ontological distinction 
and pose the ontological question in its rightful place, we may observe that 
although many things have changed over the centuries, the classical defini-
tion of an “entity” has stayed relatively stable since Aristotle’s Metaphysics. 
We could sum up this “classical understanding” of the entity in three basic 
principles which I will call actuality, individuality and identity.
The principle of actuality states that an entity is something determined. Its 
formulation can be traced back to Aristotle’s exposition of the law of non-
contradiction (Met. 1005b 19-20). Aristotle observed that the most general 
thing that can be said about an entity is that it is something. Obvious as it 
may seem, this observation has two important metaphysical implications. 
First, it supposes the ontological validity of the principle of non-contradic-
tion, for if we are to say something determinate about an entity we cannot 
say that it has a property P and at the same time that it doesn’t have it. 
Aristotle’s main argument for this conclusion is that “if all contradictory 
propositions were true at the same time in respect to the same thing, then 
clearly everything will be one” (Met. 1007b 18-21). If everything was one, 
then it would be useless to ask about something what it is, since it would 
be everything. Secondly, it also supposes the validity of the law of excluded 
middle: “of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate” 
(Met. 1011b, 25-30). To say that something is determinate is to say that it 
has determinate properties, and if we couldn’t say of an entity if it is P or 
not, then we would not be able to say something determinate about it. These 
abstract features are condensed in the highly complex notion of “actuality” 
(ἐνέργεια). An actual entity is a determined entity, as opposed to a potential 
one, which could in principle tolerate opposite determinations simulta-
neously (cf. Lukasiewicz & Wedin 501).
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The second principle, which I have termed individuality, states that a determi-
nate entity is to be considered as an individual, so that it can always count 
as one.5 This principle, in turn, supposes the validity of Leibniz law, for if we 
are to determine an entity E, we must in principle be able to find at least one 
property P so that:
 (i) PE
 (ii) PX ⊃ x = E
We are heirs to a long tradition according to which every entity can be parti-
cularized in virtue of its properties, so that we can distinguish one entity from 
another by naming or “labeling” them (Redhead & Teller 1992 201-202; 
Krause 157).
Finally, the principle of identity establishes that the entity is the same through 
the change of its properties. Graphically, this relation is usually though as a 
kind of “nuclear” thing and its many “orbital” properties. Etymologically, this 
picture is condensed in the word “substance”, which comes from the Latin 
“sub-stare” which means “to stand under”, hence “to persist”. So I will call this 
a “substantial structure” of identity. Although identity and individuality are 
sometimes considered together it will be useful to distinguish the question of 
the latter as an inter-specific question concerning the relation between entities, 
and the question of the former as an intra-specific question concerning the 
entity’s relation to its own determinations.
These three principles can be thought as constituting a core common-sense 
about physical reality. A noteworthy example of this common-sense can be 
found in a letter sent by Einstein to Max Born on 12th May 1952, while 
discussing the problem of locality in Bohm’s interpretation:
An essential aspect of this arrangement of things [in a space-time continuum] 
in physics is that they lay claim, at a certain time, to an existence independent 
of one another (...) Unless one makes this kind of assumption about the inde-
pendence of the existence of objects which are far apart one another in space 
(...) physical thinking in the familiar sense would not be possible (Born , 170)
Although Einstein was not primarily concerned with our current discus-
sion, it is clear that his realist defense of physical science involves a “classical 
understanding” of the notion of “entity”. Einstein is in fact known for having 
adopted a “conservative” stance towards quantum physics, especially in regard 
to the possibility of constructing a realist interpretation of the formalism. 
5 For further analysis on the relation between “individuality” and “countability”, see Cushing (1994) and Lowe.
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This was not the case for Heisenberg, who did thought that QM described 
a “reality” of its own. But before moving to Heisenberg’s theory, we must 
analyze the way in which quantum phenomena defies this “common-sense 
view” about physical reality.
4. “quantum” Challenges FoR ClassiCal ontology
All the three classical principles mentioned above face serious difficulties 
when we try to employ them in our understanding of QM. In order to remain 
systematic, I will briefly mention three respective “counter-principles” of OQ, 
namely: the principle of contextuality, the principle of contraction and the 
principle of duality.
First, consider quantum contextuality. Suppose we have a quantum system 
SAB with two incompatible observables represented by two non-commuta-
tive operators ÔA and ÔB. Suppose that ÔA represents “momentum” and ÔB 
represents “position”, and that each operator has three possible values: {a1, a2, 
a3} and {b1, b2, b3}, respectively. Given Heisenberg’s uncertainty principle, 
we know that we cannot measure a determinate value for both properties 
simultaneously. So we say that momentum and position belong to different 
contexts. And we can define a context as a subset of observables of a quantum 
system represented by commutative operators (Karakostas). Furthermore, 
given the Kochen-Specker theorem, we know that we cannot consistently 
assume that a determinate measurement will be possible for two observables 
belonging to different experimental contexts.
How is contextuality encountering the classical principle of actuality? We 
have seen that in OC the entity is thought as being actual, i.e., as having deter-
minate properties. This in turn entailed the validity of the law of excluded 
middle, since for every property P, either the entity has it or it doesn’t. There 
is no “hesitation answer” to the question “Does E has P?” Hesitation would 
be at best a subjective state: we do not know if E has P. The problem with 
quantum contextuality is that we cannot interpret hesitation as a subjective 
state. The Kochen-Specker theorem frustrates every direct attempt to unders-
tand indeterminacy as an epistemological limitation, because there is no 
hidden-variable theory that would give us the complete set of determinate 
properties independently of any context. This is why some have argued for an 
“irreducible indetermination” in quantum reality (cf. Lombardi & Pérez 2012 
148-155). If this is so, then we cannot sustain the law of excluded middle since 
we must accept that if SAB has a determinate momentum, then its position 
must be literally undetermined.
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The second principle, which I call principle of contraction, poses a serious diffi-
culty to classical individuality. It has already been noted that the existence 
of the so-called “identical particles” in quantum physics requires a radical 
reformulation of the idea of an “individual” (French & Krause).
Suppose an experimental arrangement for measuring the energy state of 
two bosons, ‘a’ and ‘b’. Suppose, in addition, that there are two possible 
energy states for each boson, E1 and E2, which represent discrete magnitudes 
determined by Planck’s constant (85-94). In a classical understanding, the 
probability distribution would be as follows:
E1 E2 P
1 a b P(1) = ¼
2 ab P(2) = ¼
3 ab P(3) = ¼
4 b a P(4) = ¼
But since ‘a’ and ‘b’ are indiscernible we cannot even “label” each boson, 
although we “know” there are two of them. However, this might not threaten 
the idea of individual particles. One could think that both ‘a’ and ‘b’ are in 
fact individual particles, even if we cannot label them. If this were so, the 
probability distribution would be as follows:
E1 E2 P
1 ** P(1) = ¼  
2 * * P(2) = ½
3 ** P(3) = ¼
In this case probabilities are reduced to three, since P(1) and P(4) have become 
indistinguishable. So P(2) represents the addition of two different probabili-
ties (¼ + ¼ = ½).
However we know that classical “Maxwell-Boltzmann” statistics does not 
apply in the case of bosons. The experimental outcomes show another kind of 
probability distribution called “Bose-Einstein statistics”:
E1 E2 P
1 ** P(1) = ⅓
2 * * P(2) = ⅓
3 ** P(3) = ⅓
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How are we to interpret these results? Philosophically speaking, it must be 
recognized that this probability distribution is at odds with our intuitive 
ideas about individuality. Since the first distribution does not obtain, we must 
admit that ‘a’ and ‘b’ are indistinguishable. But since the second distribution 
does not obtain either, we cannot interpret this limitation epistemologically. 
The principle of contraction forbids the abstraction of thinking two individual 
entities in the context of quantum mechanics. What is not at all clear is what 
we should think about, instead.
Finally, the principle of duality is at variance with the classical principle of 
identity. As Grossman concisely puts it:
The history of physics seems to indicate the belief that the presence of change 
must be explained on the basis of something which does not change. That 
which remains invariant under a given transformation is always regarded as 
belonging to a deeper level of reality than that which undergoes the transfor-
mation (88).
In metaphysical terms, this means that a thing’s identity remains invariant (it 
maintains invariant properties) through changes in its (non-essential) deter-
minations. However, in the famous double-slit experiment the entity labeled 
“electron” seems to radically change all its (essential and non-essential) 
properties when the number of opened slits is changed. This fact “is the crux 
of all attempts to make 'sense' out of quantum mechanics” (80). According to 
Grossman’s diagnosis, if we are to maintain classical identity, we should seek 
for something “deeper” which would ontologically explain the discontinuous 
changes in the “upper” level.
But as we have seen, these “deeper level” would contain entities which are 
contextual (they do not exhibit classical determination) and contracted (they 
are not individuals, strictly speaking). This is why Heisenberg declared that 
wave-particle duality cannot be explained in terms of “relations between 
objects existing in space and time” (Heelan 1975 49), as was Einstein’s aspi-
ration. Though “being measured”, for instance, is supposed to be an external 
determination of an entity, the change in the measurement arrangement will 
determine if the electron exhibits “wave properties” or “particle properties”, 
which “are too different to be simultaneous properties of the same thing” (80).
In other words, it seems we should discard the notion of “the same thing” 
without discarding the notion of properties being instantiated. This leads to an 
inversion of the “substantial structure” of identity mentioned above, since we 
lack that “substantial” element which is supposed to “stand under” both the 
wave and the particle properties.
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5. ontologiCal PluRalism as “the best oF both woRlds”
The perplexity raised by what I have called “the ontological question” leaves 
us with one vital question: how are we to understand the relation between 
both ontologies? If we consider this question from the ontological perspective 
outlined above, we get a sort of metaphysical disjunction (“OC or OQ”) from 
which we must consider the three logically possible answers:
a. Drop OC and retain OQ
b. Drop OQ and retain OC
c. Retain both OC and OQ
(a). The first strategy would be to disregard quantum mechanics as a theory 
about the world, and thus preserving traditional Aristotelian logic and meta-
physics. In fact I believe that the “Copenhagen Interpretation”, today’s 
dominant interpretation of QM, falls into this option. Although it is dubious 
to speak of one Copenhagen Interpretation (Cf. Howard) it is clear that all of 
them share the notion of “complementarity” as a starting point.
Following Kant, Bohr argues that human experience is classic: individual 
entities which are determined and identical to themselves. In so far as in 
physics the experimental stance is needed, it cannot give up this macroscopic 
ontology. Otherwise, it would lose its possibility to communicate the diffe-
rent experimental results. In the case of quantum physics, however, we must 
renounce classical ontology since “it is no longer possible sharply to distin-
guish between the autonomous behavior of a physical object and its inevitable 
interaction with other bodies serving as measuring instruments” (Bohr 1937 
290). As each experimental arrangement directly affects the measured system, 
QM introduces a fundamental discontinuity which is reflected in the wave-
particle duality. Since wave and particle are both classical concepts which 
exclude one another, their application to the quantum realm is somehow 
inappropriate. But we cannot but use them if we are to communicate our 
experimental results, since “every word in the language refers to our ordinary 
perception” (Bohr 1934 91). The idea of complementarity is thought to consti-
tute an answer to this paradox (or “irrational feature of the postulate” as Bohr 
himself calls it) because with it we are able to understand the incompatibility 
of both images, but also their need in order to give “an exhaustive account of 
all experience” (Bohr 1937 291).
Bohr’s attempt to preserve the primacy of OC becomes evident in the “wave 
function collapse” postulate, according to which a measured quantity is forced 
to a particular eigenstate by the measuring act itself (in this case, the modifi-
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cation of the number of opened slits). With the Kantian-inspired restriction 
of complementarity, Bohr dismisses the possibility that QM gives an objective 
account of Nature, since both the measurement instruments and the quantum 
system are indistinguishable, and “the formation of human ideas [is] inherent 
in the distinction between subject and object” (Bohr 1934 91).
(b). The second strategy would go in the opposite direction, i.e., discarding OC 
in the light of the features of OQ. For instance, one may trace this tendency in 
Hilary Putnam’s famous essay Is Logic Empirical? Here, Putnam suggests that 
empirical evidence provided by quantum physics should be a sufficient reason 
to conclude that “it is more likely that classical logic is wrong” (189). In other 
words, to solve the problem of understanding quantum mechanics we should 
recognize that classical logic was, after all, an inadequate formalization of 
the relations which take place in Nature, and therefore a new logic should be 
adopted. This “quantum” logic would be such that, for instance, the distribu-
tion law does not obtain (since, of course, Leibniz law does not obtain either). 
(c) The third strategy, which I have called ontological pluralism, is the one I 
am interested in discussing. Pluralism has gained currency especially after the 
demise of logical empiricism and its project of reducing the sciences under 
one explanatory model. Ontological pluralism (OP), by contrast, “takes each 
scientific theory to have its own distinct domain of laws, entities, and concepts, 
which cannot be reduced to those of any other theory” (Bokulich 2001).
Following a rough classification, we could envisage three main arguments in 
favor of ontological pluralism: first, a historical argument; second, a heuristic 
argument; and finally a metaphysical argument.
The historical argument was famously put forward by Kuhn and Feyerabend 
(1988). Kuhn’s famous thesis of incommensurability and his view of scien-
tific historical progress as a discontinuous succession of paradigms had an 
immense impact for the pluralist account of scientific knowledge. Since terms 
as “space” of “body” radically change their meaning from one paradigm to 
another, it is no longer possible to reduce one theory’s language to another. 
Paul Feyerabend, echoing J.S. Mill’s famous essay On Liberty (1859/1990) and 
Hegel’s historical-developmental view of human knowledge, argued that if we 
look at the history of science, we will not find a unitary, rational approach to 
the world, but rather an “ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives” which 
work simultaneously for “the development of our consciousness” (1978 21).
The second kind of argument focuses instead on the practical advantages of 
maintaining a plurality of different (and even incompatible) theories. Hasok 
Chang (2012) has recently argued that each theory is “part of a coherent 
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system of scientific practice. None of those systems should be given the right 
to suppress, exclude, or delegitimize the others, because we need all of those 
systems to give ourselves maximal exposure to reality” (15). If we have a plura-
lity of different approaches to the real world, we diminish the risk of imposing 
a priori restrictions motivated by metaphysical or ideological prejudices. 
Einstein’s reaction to the nonlocal character of QM mentioned in section 
2 can be seen as an example of what Chang means here. In fact, as I have 
argued, it is his maintenance of OC which motivates his critique of Bohm’s 
interpretation of QM.
The third type of argument has been clearly put forward by Nancy Cart-
wright (1994). In her opinion, “all evidence points to the conclusion (…) 
that Nature is not reductive and single-minded. She has a rich, and diverse, 
tolerant imagination and is happily running both classical and quantum 
mechanics side-by-side” (1994 361). So, as Bokulich (8-14) rightly argues, her 
contention is based on metaphysical rather than epistemological grounds. For 
Cartwright, the idea of a unitary of “single-minded” Nature is no more than 
an unwarranted metaphysical commitment which in fact should be ques-
tioned in the light of the actual plurality of scientific theories.
So OP becomes an attractive middle ground between the other two poles. A 
pluralist stance respects the idiosyncratic features of each theory, while at the 
same time restricts their ontology to what is required by the mathematical 
formalism. In the case of physics, the pluralist is able to recognize that OC 
is essential to understand macroscopic processes while at the same time OQ 
becomes indispensable in the subatomic world, without the need to place both 
ontologies under a single framework. Here the expression “world” should be 
interpreted in a fairly strong sense, i.e., as if each theory “constituted” its 
own world.
An exemplary case of OP in the classical-quantum debate is to be found 
in Werner Heisenberg’s philosophical book Physics and Philosophy, where he 
argues that the history of physics is a succession of different theories, each 
of them being a “closed system” [abgeschlossene System]. A “closed system” or 
“closed theory” is “a system of definitions and axioms which can be written in 
a set of mathematical equations” where each sharply-defined concept is repre-
sented by a particular symbol and each symbol is related to a certain “field 
of experience”, so that the whole system may be considered as “describing an 
eternal structure of nature, depending neither on a particular space nor on 
particular time” (92-93).
According to this definition, these systems exhibit three main features. First, 
a closed system is axiomatic, in the sense that the possibility of formalizing a 
A critique of Ontological Pluralism
19
set of concepts and relations is a necessary condition of every physical theory. 
Second, the system is holistic, because the concepts are so firmly related to 
each other that “one could generally not change any one of the concepts 
without destroying the whole system” (94). Thirdly, a closed system must be 
considered final in the sense that its laws “describe certain features of nature 
that are correct at all times and everywhere” (99). It is in virtue of these three 
features that the system is thought to be an “eternal structure of nature”. Each 
system structures its proper domain, and therefore generates its own notion of 
“reality”. In other words, each system constitutes a differentiated ontology, not 
just by providing an inventory of real entities, but by redefining in each case 
the very notion of reality itself.
Heisenberg, for example, defines Newtonian physics as “the ontology of mate-
rialism” (145) whose worldview consists of an objective structure composed 
by actual entities, just like in Einstein’s description. By contrast, Heisen-
berg thinks that the “entities” portrayed by the formalism of QM should be 
understood in terms of the Aristotelian notion of potentia [δύναμις]. In the 
Aristotelian ontology, potentiality is related to change and the indeterminate 
matter. Since a potential entity is indeterminate, it lacks the features we usually 
ascribe to determinate entities: individuality, identity, non-contradiction. 
Thus, the paradoxical aspect of the “wave-particle duality” fades away once 
we recognize that a state such as a quantum superposition is not composed 
by actual entities (like “waves” or “particles”) but rather by “indeterminate” 
entities which “form a world of potentialities or possibilities rather than one 
of things or facts” (185-186).
6. ontologiCal PluRalism and sCientiFiC undeRstanding
As Bokulich observes,
(...) the picture that starts to emerge from Heisenberg’s account of 
closed theories is a kind of theoretical pluralism: contemporary science is 
characterized by a handful of distinct closed theories, each with its own 
circumscribed domain, within which the theory is perfectly accurate and 
unalterable (7).
From this point of view, Heisenberg’s pluralism rests in a sort of inter-theo-
retic tolerance, since “future research then cannot falsify a Closed Theory; it 
can only discover restrictions on its domain” (Heelan 1975 7). This is why 
some have observed the close similarity between Heisenberg’s notion of abges-
chlossene System and Kuhn’s idea of “paradigm” (cf. Beller; Bokulich).
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Yet other features become visible here. OP poses a specific strategy for unders-
tanding a scientific theory, since in order to understand a theory T we ought to 
ask how the world is according to T. And this is done by providing a thorough 
analysis of T’s language, i.e., its basic terms and concepts. So we must look 
at the several symbols present in T’s language and ask what those symbols are 
standing for.
James T. Cushing (1991; 1994) has provided a very interesting insight concer-
ning the concept and nature of scientific understanding. He distinguished 
three different levels of scientific discourse: (a) empirical adequacy, (b) explana-
tion and (c) understanding. Empirical adequacy consists essentially in “getting 
the numbers right”, in the sense of providing an algorithm which is capable of 
reproducing observed data and measurements (1991 338). An example of this 
would be Planck’s constant h, which describes mathematically the observed 
relationships between energy and frequency. An explanation “is provided by 
a successful formalism with a set of equations and rules for its application” 
(1994 10). Explanation in this sense is understood “in terms of entailment” 
and becomes equivalent to the so-called deductive-nomological model (10). 
This level would correspond to Heisenberg’s notion of a closed system, i.e., 
a set of applicable formulas. The third level is that of understanding, which 
“produces in us a sense of understanding how the world could possibly be 
the way it is” (11). Understanding is achieved through the interpretation of 
the formalism.6 This would correspond to Heisenberg’s metaphysical inter-
pretation of the “closed system” known as quantum mechanics in terms of 
Aristotelian potentialities.
Cushing cites Heisenberg’s suggestion as an attempt to increase our unders-
tanding of quantum phenomena (1991 348). However, it should be noted that 
Heisenberg is not the only one to adopt this strategy. Cartwright (1994), for 
example, states that the intelligibility of an interpretation must be addressed 
by asking what does the quantum wave function Ψ represents (55). Krause 
has also provided a similar strategy. He adopts a strange ontology of “non-
individuals”, and defines a non-individual as “an entity for which it makes no 
sense to say, among other things, that it is equal or distinct from others of the 
same species” (162). He then argues that some symbols such as the numeral 
6 Cushing describes understanding as a “pragmatic bonus” in scientific explanation, in so far as it depends 
on contextual factors that determine our sense of understanding as human beings (1991 340). However, 
he argues that some features of understanding as such are susceptible to an objective description. One of 
these features is picturability (341), i.e., understanding must involve picturable physical mechanisms. While 
I mostly agree with his contention that understanding involves the need for a picturable model of the world, 
I believe that this is enough in order to give a formal definition of comprehension, while Cushing thinks it 
necessarily entails an atomistic, casual and mechanistic picture of the world (351-353).
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‘6’ in the formula for the sodium atom (1s22s22p63s1) should be regarded as 
representing “non-individuals”, which in this case are electrons (163).
My contention is that the idea of providing a comprehensible picture of the 
world by relating the diverse symbols of the theory’s language as represen-
ting something is idiosyncratic to OP. Note that there are two related issues 
here: first, what it means to understand something in general, and second, 
how understanding is achieved through a scientific theory. The relation-
ship between these two assumptions and OP has received scant attention. 
However, it is possible to provide a general characterization of both of them.
I will call the first assumption “comprehension thesis” (CT). According to 
CT, to “understand” or “comprehend” something is to relate a multiplicity of 
elements trough a finite number of non-arbitrary relations in a single system. 
This is already indicated in the etymology of the word “comprehension”: it 
comes from the Latin compound of “con” and “prehendere” which literally 
means “to put together, to reunite”. So something is said to be (rationally) 
comprehended when some set of elements (which may appear as indifferent 
to each other) are brought together in a single set of relations. This is a fairly 
intuitive description of what understanding means. But this is not enough.
In the case of scientific theories, comprehension is typically achieved through 
the fixation of the referents of some of the symbols in the theory’s language. 
Those symbols are then related to non-symbolic items –they are given “an 
ontic status”, in the words of Cushing (1991 348). Once a symbol is fixed to 
an “entity” (in the broadest sense of the term) that referential relation persists. 
I call this “principle of referential persistence” (PRP). A symbol Ψ persistently 
refers to an item of the world E iff Ψ refers to E in every occurrence of Ψ in a 
theory T. When each symbol becomes “attached” to its referent, the resulting 
articulation constitutes the domain of each theory.
The core of the present discussion focuses especially on this idea of “compre-
hension” behind OP. In this regard it must be asked in what sense the pluralist 
is able to make quantum mechanics comprehensible for us. Since, as I have 
tried to show, OP maintains CT, we should ask to what extent does the plura-
list exploit CT and why.
OP provides a comprehensive picture of the quantum world by applying CT 
to QM’s formalism. This application seeks to comprehend the theory’s multiple 
expressions (superposition, spin, “wave”, particle, etc.) under a single domain 
by relating those multiple expressions in a non-arbitrary way, i.e., in a way 
that each occurrence of those expressions makes sense as a part of a quantum 
reality, albeit a very bizarre one. This attempt to gain an understanding of the 
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quantum world distinguishes OP from a merely instrumentalist approach, 
which Huw Price (1992, 405) characterized as an “ontological asceticism”. 
OP and instrumentalism are distinct in that the former is concerned with 
ontological issues while the latter is not. Indeed, it is precisely because the 
pluralist provides an “ontological picture” for each theory that she considers 
her effort as an intellectually valid one. Take, for example, Ronald Giere’s 
definition of scientific understanding:
I understand theorizing as the construction of models. (…) Often, as in 
physics, abstract models are characterized using interpreted mathematical 
expressions (…). The world seems to be such that specific models structured 
according to the principles can be made to exhibit a close fit with systems in the 
real world (Giere, 32 my emphasis).
This, of course, does not imply that there is a single model of reality. In fact, 
OP rests on the denial of such a possibility. Giere, for example, proposes a 
“perspectival pluralism” in which “the only adequate overall picture will be 
collages of pictures from various perspectives” (Giere 28). This, however, does 
not make the pluralist drop CT altogether, because she restricts its application 
to a “local” level. A local version of CT is the thesis that each theory must 
be internally comprehended –in the technical sense of comprehension sket-
ched above.
However, this raises a further issue. Can we maintain a realist conception 
of physical science under OP’s restriction of CT? At first, it would seem as 
we have lost any possibility of understanding both classical and quantum 
mechanics as descriptions of nature. It would seem that CT and PRP need 
to be maintained also in a global level, if we are to conceive science as a kind 
of knowledge whose limits “are made not by any group of scientists but by 
nature itself” (Heisenberg, 194).
An obvious response to this objection would be to deny the need of unifica-
tion in order to make OC and OQ comprehensible. In fact, this is precisely 
the aim of OP’s metaphysical argument: to show that there is no reason to 
suppose that nature is “single-minded”. So the need for a global application of 
CT would be supported by what Kellert, et al (2006) calls a “mistaken ideal”, 
namely, “that successful science must offer a comprehensive and global theory 
of the phenomena being investigated” (192).
However, this well-known answer faces some difficulties once we have recog-
nized OP’s own account of scientific understanding. First of all, the pluralist 
must explain her actual use of CT in the local level. Why should we accept 
CT straightforwardly in a local level and at the same time deny it in a global 
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one? Moreover, the pluralist must equally explain her use of the expression 
“physical science” to both classical and quantum mechanics. If each theory 
“has its own world”, i.e., if they are conceived as systems that generate their 
own notion of “reality”, why should we call both worlds “physical”? In a word: 
it would seem that if OP uses CT, then its restriction is unwarranted.
Once we get to this point, OP’s only criterion to describe both theories as 
“being about nature” would be merely pragmatic. This, for example, is the 
case with Giere, who recognizes that the idea of “a single world with a unique 
structure” is a methodological maxim which tells us to proceed “as if there 
is a single world with a unique structure” (1999 32). On a local level, then, 
both CT and PRP help us to understand what a theory is talking about. 
The multiple symbols are interpreted as referring to some aspect of a unitary 
phenomenon, i.e., the world according to that theory. But in a global level, 
we must instead settle with the idea that CM and QM must be thought as if 
they described the physical realm. But this would simply mean that we have 
given up the possibility to comprehend the relationship between OC and OQ.
Let me clarify this point. The fact that OP works with a notion of “unders-
tanding” which makes it unable to comprehend the relation between two 
ontologies does not prove that pluralism is wrong. Neither has it demons-
trated, against Cartwright, the truth of the metaphysical thesis that there is 
one Nature. The point is rather that there is an internal tension in OP given 
its own criteria of understanding, which I have described as a compound of 
CT and PRP. In a nutshell: if we consider OP’s own presuppositions, we must 
say that Nature is, as such, incomprehensible, even if we accept Cartwright’s 
suggestion that Nature is “plural”.7
So the pluralist must choose: either she abandons CT altogether or she fully 
applies it. If she chooses the former option, it is impossible to distinguish onto-
logical pluralism from an instrumentalist account of scientific theories, since 
the problem of comprehending those theories as being about something would 
be completely obliterated. But the other option seems equally inconvenient 
for the pluralist. Given her maintenance of PRP, an unrestricted application 
would imply the need to bring all symbols under an interpretation, so that 
their referents become fixed. But given the global application of CT, this 
would mean that every symbol would be related to each other as a part of a 
unitary language whose sole referent would be the world as a comprehended 
7 This line of argument is indeed very close to Cushing’s concerns. However, unlike Cushing, my contention is 
that in its actual stage of development, OP would not help us to gain understanding not because its picture 
is not mechanistic (as he would argue) but rather because it has no way of constructing a single picture. That 
single picture need not necessarily be a mechanistic one.
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unity. This, of course, would leave us with a “Theory of Everything”. This is 
precisely why the advocates of OP restrict their application of CT.
It seems, then, that the main reason for this internal weakness is that OP 
upholds a representational conception of scientific theories according to which 
a theory is a description of physical reality (whether this reality is single-minded 
or not). This commitment is obviously manifested in the maintenance of PRP.
6.1. Afterword: giving up representation
The main question of this paper has been about the possibility of unders-
tanding different ontologies. In particular, the case of quantum mechanics 
is appealing because it suggests that OP is incapable of making sense of 
the relationship between two distinct ontologies. The problem of QM itself 
arises because we are already devoted to the idea that physics describes the 
physical world, while the features of QM’s formalism strike us as strange 
and incomprehensible. But the more general problem is precisely the idea of 
“comprehension” lurking behind OP’s presuppositions.
The classic examples of global comprehension of theories are thought under 
the nomological-deductive model, so that comprehension implies derivabi-
lity. The best-known example is that of the reduction of thermodynamics to 
statistical mechanics, as was put forward by Ernest Nagel in his famous book 
The Structure of Science (1961). After Nagel, a vast number of scientists and 
philosophers of science criticized his model. Many argued that there are no 
historical examples of Nagelian reduction (cf. Sklar; Scerri and McIntyre). 
Others criticized its application to other disciplines such as biology (Kitcher 
1984; Rosenberg) and psychology (Fodor).
This long tradition makes it easy to understand why the idea of a “global 
comprehension” is seen by the pluralist as an old-dated reductionist preten-
sion which has no philosophical attractive whatsoever. Hence, a pluralist such 
as Alan Richardson argues that “an internal ontology within any style of 
reasoning is our only place to speak of ontology at all” (8).
But does global comprehension really imply inter-theoretical reduction? In 
some cases, the need for a global comprehension is related not with the reduc-
tion of a theory to another, but rather with the rise of a new discipline. Why 
is it, for example, that modern anthropology replaced theology as an explana-
tion of human reality? The anthropological sciences were developed out of the 
need to integrate human being to the same world other sciences talked about. 
As Eller (2007) concisely put it: “If mind, body, society, culture, nature, and 
supernature are all dimensions of an integrated system, then we should expect 
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to find connections between and reflections of each in the others” (147). If we 
had to use Heisenberg’s own terms, we would say that as long theology was 
“isolated” [abgeschlossene] it could not survive as a comprehensive explanation 
of human phenomena.8 Vitalism had a similar fate in relation to biology (cf. 
Prigogine and Stengers).
However, none of these “new” disciplines was actually reduced to another. 
They preserved their autonomy, but nevertheless they gave us already a sense 
of understanding. Thus, reduction is not a unique way to global comprehen-
sion. Nor is it the most frequent, as we have seen.
Rather, global comprehension occurs because we are able to explain some 
features of the world in terms of other features of the same world. This 
“explanatory immanence” is pervasive even in contemporary philosophy of 
science. We call it “naturalism”. Even the most enthusiastic pluralists are 
self-described as naturalists. Giere (38), for instance, defends naturalism as 
“the most fundamental framework” of scientific activity. This allows him to 
reject appeals both to supernatural entities and a priori claims. In a slogan: 
nothing explains Nature but Nature itself. Even though naturalism does not 
imply a unified theory of nature, it does imply the idea of a single natural 
system, for if we had several, non-connected natural systems, we could easily 
defend any form of supernaturalism. But again, since Giere cannot take an 
ontological stance towards this idea, he must also interpret naturalism as a 
methodological stance which is justified “to the extent that it can be justified 
at all, simply by appeal to past successes. We have explained life scientifically. 
Why not consciousness?” (39).
But I believe Giere is not taking the need for a naturalist account seriously 
enough. The need to explain life or consciousness in terms of natural pheno-
mena is not motivated by the fact that we were successful before. This 
justification presupposes that we already know what a “successful explana-
tion” means, and this is just precisely the issue under discussion. Giere is 
obliterating the only relevant question: Why those past explanations were 
successful at all?
Here, the demand for a unified system seems to be stronger than just a 
methodological thesis motivated by a historical induction; and arguably 
weaker than an a priori and eternal condition of the understanding. Rather, it 
would be what Cushing calls “contingently necessary conditions for unders-
tanding” (1991 349). This does not exclude the possibility of formulating an 
8 Of course this reason is not exhaustive. As has been rightly pointed out by Cushing, there are “subjective and 
ineliminable” criteria which can have a decisive importance in theory-election processes (Cushing 1994 7).
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alternative concept of “understanding”, but this is not certainly something 
ontological pluralists have done.
If this is so, then OP cannot simply drop CT. It seems, then, that the only 
viable way to preserve comprehension in an ontological level without appea-
ling to reductionism is to abandon PRP in favor of an alternative account of 
the way in which scientific theories relate to the physical world. Although the 
exposition of such an alternative obviously exceeds the scope of the present 
discussion, let me suggest that there is a good reason to drop PRP.
In order for referential persistence to take place, two conditions must be 
fulfilled: first, it must be possible to make a distinction between the repre-
sentation and that which is represented. In the case of referential persistence, 
what is needed is the possibility to identify an item as a representation (e.g., 
the symbol ‘e’) and another item as that which is represented (an electron or 
the class of electrons). Second, it requires that both the symbol and the item 
represented by the symbol retain their identities through time. Only then we 
can say that a symbol S persistently refers to an item E in every occurrence of 
the symbol in question. Both conditions are straightforwardly satisfied within 
OC, where the principles of actuality, individuality and identity obtain. But it 
is clear from the discussion above that, within OQ, both requirements become 
difficult (if not impossible) to satisfy. What becomes clear from this is that 
OP’s maintenance of PRP reveals a vestige of classical ontology within plura-
list accounts of ontological diversity.
If OP is to succeed in giving us a compelling way of understanding incompa-
tible ontologies, it must first revise its own presuppositions. If not, pluralists 
will let ontological prejudice preclude the possibility of understanding.
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